Recently, the spectacular innovations in the fields of wireless body area networks (WBAN) and the Internet of Things (IoT) have made e-Care services rise as a promising application domain, which significantly advances the quality of the medical system, however, due to the openness of the wireless environment and privacy of people's physiological data, WBAN and IoT are prone to various cyber-a acks. There is a significant need for an efficient and highly secured cryptographic scheme that can meet the requirements of resource-constrained devices. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a certificate-based signcryption (CB-SN) scheme for the IoT-enabled WBAN. The proposed scheme is based on the concept of hyper-elliptic curve cryptography (HECC) that offers the same level of security as the elliptic curve and bilinear pairing with lower-key size. The formal security verification using the Automated Validation of the Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool along with informal security analysis demonstrate that the proposed scheme is not just reducing the complexity of resource-constrained IoT devices, but proves to be secure against several well-known cryptographic a acks. Moreover, performance comparison with relevant existing schemes authenticates that the proposed scheme is far more secure and energy efficient. different algorithms separately, i.e., signature and then encryption at the same time. In 1997, Zheng was the pioneer to merge these two processes in one algorithm, called signcryption [7] . This scheme is based on the concept of old public key cryptography (PKC), which is suffering from certificate overheads, renewing, and revocation problems [8] . Shamir was the first to propose an alternate concept of PKC, called identity-based cryptography (IBC) [9] . This technique removed the limitations of PKC and used the identity in place of a certificate. Later, in 2002, Malone-Lee [10], for the first time merged the concept of IBC with the signcryption technique, namely, identity-based signcryption (IBS). The IBS includes three entities, for example, a sender (signcrypter), a receiver (unsigncrypter), and the private key generation center (PKGC), respectively. In this setup, the users (signcrypter and unsigncrypter) generate their identities and after that, send it to the PKGC. Then, the PKGC produces and delivers the private keys for all the participating users, by using the secured networks. Unfortunately, IBS suffers from the key escrow issue (KEI), because the private key is generated by the PKGC and one can easily use this key for forging the digital signature and decrypting the ciphertext [11] .
Introduction
In the current era, the Internet of things (IoT) is one of the most debatable topics among the research community of information technology. The IoT includes all those devices, which have the capacity of computing, communication, and connection with the Internet [1] . The IoT has so many applications in our daily lives, i.e., it is used in smart cities, smart homes, and e-health, etc. [2] . By providing faster access to the treatment of patients, the wireless body area networks (WBAN) integrate with the Internet of things (IoT) and play an important role in the patient health care system, because this ecosystem, enables all the users and devices to access the patient's psychological data from anywhere and anytime in the world by utilizing the Internet [3] . However, due to the open nature of the Internet, authenticity and data security are the two major concerns in the IoT based WBAN [4] .
The authenticity of IoT is ensured through digital signature [5] , and data security is met by using the encryption method [6] , although the IoT has a resource hungry nature and cannot afford these two 
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Hyper-Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ℎ − ) )
Assume is the divisor which ispublicly available in the network and ℒ is the randomly picked private number from ℑ t . Recovering ℒ from 1 = , ℒ is said to be ℎ − [27] .
Automated Validation Tool for Security Validation and Application (AVISPA)
Currently, AVISPA is the utmost valuable tool among researchers of information security, in which they check the authenticity of their newly designed cryptographic protocol security properties. For the overall structure of AVISPA, it can be a be er choice to see the article [24] , in which it includes the most expensive formal language called high level protocol specification language (HLPSL), a compilation translator called HLPSL2IF, an intermediate format (IF) , and the four backends models for checking the security properties, i.e., on-the-fly model checker (O-f-M-C), constraint logic-based a ack searcher (CL-ATSe), SAT-based model checker (Sat-M-C), and tree automata based on automatic approximations for the analysis of security protocols (TA-4 SP), respectively. If the cryptographic user famines to trial their approach security, then he/she first compose the HLPSL code for their approach in SPAN, which is the graphical user interface (GUI) for AVISPA, furthermore, the HLPSL2IF is responsible for compiling this code into IF, and IF handover the code to the four model checkers, for example, (O-f-M-C), (CL-ATSe), (SAT-M-C), and (TA-4 SP) for the checking of man-in-the-middle a ack and replay a ack. Therefore, if these two a acks are possible in their respective protocol then these model checkers give UNSAFE simulation results and if it is not possible then it shows the SAFE results.
Syntax of Certificate-based Signcryption (CB-SN)
The proposed CB-SN scheme is the improved version of the Braeken et al. [17] scheme, and includes five algorithms such as, setup, public variable generation (PVG), certificate generation (CG), actors key generation (AKG), signcryption generation (SG), and unsigncryptions (US), respectively. We explain the syntax of CB-SN in the following steps:
1.
Setup: Certifier's authority (C s A) recognizes a security parameter as input data and runs the setup algorithm to make essential parameters set {h , δ, ℑ t , , ℐ h , Τ, ℋ 1 , ℋ 2 , ℋ 3 } and a master secret key Y and public key T = Υ. , respectively. The essential parameters set is directly accessible on a network, anyway Y is kept by the C s A secret.
2.
Public variable generation (PVG): Each actor with identity ID A , runs the PVG algorithm to produce his public variable PV A by taking input, an essential parameter set {h , δ, ℑ t , , ℐ h , Τ, ℋ 1 , ℋ 2 , ℋ 3 }. Then, the actor having identity ID A , has sent the pair (PV A , ID A ) to C s A via an insecure link.
3.
Certificate generation (CG): By taking input (PV A , ID A ), the essential parameter set {h , δ, ℑ t , , ℐ h , Τ, ℋ 1 , ℋ 2 , ℋ 3 } and Y, C s A run the CG algorithm to produce a certificate Cert A for each actor with identity ID A and hand over a certificate with auxiliary variable ( e t A , A ) to the actors via unsecured link.
4.
Actor's key generation (AKG): Inpu ing the pair of an auxiliary variable (Cert A , aux A ), an essential parameter set {h , δ, ℑ t , , ℐ h , Τ, ℋ 1 , ℋ 2 , ℋ 3 } and the identity ID A of each actor, the participated actor's with identity ID A produces his private and public keys (A A , Q A ).
5.
Signcryption generation (SG): The SG algorithm is executed by the sender actor to produce signcryption text = {C,A,S}, of a message, m, and delivers to the receiver through an unsecured network. It takes as input the certificate of the sender and receiver (Cert s , Cert u ), the identity of a sender and receivers (ID s , ID u ), private and public key of the sender (A s , Q s ), a message (m), an essential parameter set {h , δ, ℑ t , , ℐ h , Τ, ℋ 1 , ℋ 2 , ℋ 3 }, and public key of receiver Q u . 6 .
Unsigncryptions (US): The US algorithm is executed by the receiver actor to verify and decrypts the received signcryption text = {C,A,S}. It takes as input the certificate of the sender Cert s , Figure 1 indicates the overall working of a newly designed model of this paper, which includes three main actors, i.e., a certifiers authority (CsA), application providers (APs) and WBAN of a patient's body, respectively. Hence, in this model, it is the responsibility of CsA to create a certificate for APs and WBAN by using its own secret key and obtained identity with a public variable from actors (APs and WBAN). The APs are responsible for monitoring patient conditions and any time get access to the health related information HRI, by computing certificate-based signcryption of an access request query. The WBAN contains sensor nodes, which are already planted in the body of the patient and at least contain one controller, which receives PHRI. Upon the request from the access control query from APs, the controller checks the authorization of an actor and if the actor is legitimate, then, it sends the data regarding the query request, otherwise it rejects the query demand. patient's body, respectively. Hence, in this model, it is the responsibility of CsA to create a certificate for APs and WBAN by using its own secret key and obtained identity with a public variable from actors (APs and WBAN). The APs are responsible for monitoring patient conditions and any time get access to the health related information HRI, by computing certificate-based signcryption of an access request query. The WBAN contains sensor nodes, which are already planted in the body of the patient and at least contain one controller, which receives PHRI. Upon the request from the access control query from APs, the controller checks the authorization of an actor and if the actor is legitimate, then, it sends the data regarding the query request, otherwise it rejects the query demand. Safe node and health node are the two wearable sensor nodes on each subject for environmental monitoring and for physiological parameters' measurements, respectively, in the proposed system. Furthermore, safe node is equipped with four environmental sensors to monitor the ambient temperature, relative humidity, CO2, and ultraviolet (UV) sensor. The health node is comprised of a Bluetooth 5 (802.15.1) module that is used to enable WBAN communication, a photoplethysmogram (PPG) sensor for heart rate monitoring, and a body temperature sensor. Bluetooth 5 (802.15.1) is considered the most favored option for wearable sensor nodes because of its low cost and low power consumption [28] , however, to address the short communication range issue of Bluetooth 5 for medical records to a longer distance, a smart android-based mobile device, named "controller", is used inside the WBAN's communication range. At the end of this section, in Table 1 , we provide an explanation about the symbols used in algorithm. Public keys of sender and receiver Safe node and health node are the two wearable sensor nodes on each subject for environmental monitoring and for physiological parameters' measurements, respectively, in the proposed system. Furthermore, safe node is equipped with four environmental sensors to monitor the ambient temperature, relative humidity, CO2, and ultraviolet (UV) sensor. The health node is comprised of a Bluetooth 5 (802.15.1) module that is used to enable WBAN communication, a photoplethysmogram (PPG) sensor for heart rate monitoring, and a body temperature sensor. Bluetooth 5 (802.15.1) is considered the most favored option for wearable sensor nodes because of its low cost and low power consumption [28] , however, to address the short communication range issue of Bluetooth 5 for medical records to a longer distance, a smart android-based mobile device, named "controller", is used inside the WBAN's communication range. At the end of this section, in Table 1 , we provide an explanation about the symbols used in algorithm. 
Constructions of CB-SN
The proposed scheme is an extension of the scheme presented by Braeken et al. [17] , and the working steps of the newly designed CB-SN scheme are as follows: Recover the secret key SK = A u . and produced the plaintext (m‖ N) = D (C); • Compute the hash value Λ / = H 2 (m‖ N); • Accept the signcryption text = { ,Λ, } if Λ / = H 2 (m‖ N) ≟ Λ = H 2 (m‖ N).
Correctness
The sender can compute the public key of receiver from the following computations:
while it same process at the receiver side for making the public key of the sender, by using the following computations. 
Informal Security Analysis
The proposed CB-SN scheme ensures the following informal security requirements.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality means that the contents of a plain text (m) should hide from intruders and the intruders cannot get any meaning from the signcrypted text without knowing the shared secret key. In the proposed CB-SN scheme, if the intruders desire to scramble the contents of a plain text from a signcryption text = {C,A, S}, then it is mandatory for them to reveal the shared secret key SK by computing Equation (2) . To compute this equation, it is important for the intruders to extract Ω from Equation (3), which is hard for them because this leads to computing ℎ − . Thus, our CB-SN scheme ensures cipher text confidentiality. = Ω . (4)
Integrity
Integrity means that the contents of a plain text (m) can only be modified by the intended participant or user. In our CB-SN scheme, the sender computes a hash value of a message (m) like Λ = H 2 (m‖ N) and delivers the value Λ with a cipher text to the receiver. Therefore, if an event occurred, i.e., an intruder tries to modify in cipher text C like C * , then, the intruder must modify m into m * and Λ = H 2 (m‖ N) into Λ * = H 2 (m‖ N) * , which is infeasible because of the collision resistance property of a hash function.
Unforgeability
Without the private key of a sender, the illegal user cannot produce the original signature which is called unforgeability. In our proposed CB-SN scheme, the sender computes a digital signature, i.e.,
= Ω − Λ . s . This includes the sender private number Ω and private key s , which is only known to the sender. If the intruder tries to create the same signature, he cannot do it, because discovering two unknown variables from the same equation is infeasible. Therefore, our CB-SN scheme meets the unforgeability security service.
Public Verifiability
Public verifaibility is the property of signcryption , in which the third party removes the clash among the sender and receiver, which is already causing. In our case, the sender computes the digital signature for a plain text by using his private key and it is common practice in asymmetric cryptosystem that the public key of a user is related to his private key. Therefore, for eliminating a conflict, the third party/judge can use either u ≟ ℋ 2 ( e t u , ID u ) . e t u + Τ or u ≟ ℋ 2 ( e t u , ID u ) . e t u + Τ, in which the equality of the previous two equations is available in the Section 4.1 of this paper.
Forward Secrecy
When the private key of a legitimate sender is compromised by an intruder, then, the existing communicated messages that is still safe is called forward secrecy. In our case, the sender encrypts the message ( ) like C = ℇ ( ‖N), by utilizing the secret shared key SK. If the intruder compromised the private key of the sender, furthermore, he needs the secret shared SK from Equation (2), for the decryption of cipher text. Hence, computing the secret key SK from Equation (2) is infeasible for the intruder, which is already discussed in the confidentiality section.
Anti-Replay A ack
When an intruder has captured the already communicated signcrypted text and continuously transmits this text to the receiver it is called a replay a ack. Therefore, the replay a ack is not possible in our case, because the sender sends a fresh nonce (N) in the encrypted text (C), and furthermore, the encryption process (C = ℇ ( ‖N)) is processed through a shared secret key SK, in which the nonce (N) and secret key SK are renewed for every session of communication. Therefore, the anti-replay a ack is provided in this paper. 
CB-SN Access Control for WBAN

Verification and Response
For this purpose, the controller first calls a US algorithm, that is, the controller, first, computes the public key of APs ap ≟ ℋ2 ( ap, IDap) . s + , computes = . + . ap, recovers the secret key = c . and produces the plaintext ( ‖ N) = ( ), computes the hash value / = ℋ2( ‖ N), accepts the signcryption text = { , , }, if / = ℋ2( ‖ N) ≟ = ℋ2( ‖ N) and encrypts the data QR = E (PHRI) for Aps, and delivers it using the open networks. 
Performance
We choose three main parameters that are security services, energy (computational cost), and bandwidth (communication cost), in the proposed CB-SN access control scheme and existing ones, i.e., Li et al. [22] , Omala et al. [15] , Gao et al. [24] , Braeken et al. [17] , Braeken et al. [19] Schemes 1, 2, and 3, for measuring the performance. Appendix A shows the mplementations of CB-SN Access Control Scheme in AVISPA.
Security Performance
The security performance of a designed and existing access control scheme as shown in Table 2 , in which we pick the security services and verification tool, i.e, confidentiality, unforgeability, authentication, integrity, anti-replay attack, forward secrecy, public verifiability, random oracle model, and formal verification through AVISPA, respectively. The symbols CFY, UFY, ATN, ITY, ARA, FSY, PVY, ROM, FVTA, √, and ⨵ indicate confidentiality, unforgeability, authentication, integrity, anti-replay attack, forward secrecy, public verifiability, random oracle model, formal verification through AVISPA, satisfying the service, and does not satisfy, respectively. Therefore, it 
Initialization
The CsA calls the setup process where CAs produce an essential parameter set {h , δ, ℑ t , , ℐ h , Τ, ℋ 1 , ℋ 2 , ℋ 3 } and after that select a master secret key Υ from {1,2, … , t − 1} and calculate the master public key Τ = Υ . , respectively. The essential parameters set is directly accessible on a network and the master secret key Y is kept by the C s A secret.
Registration
In addition, each actor (APs and controller) with identity ID A , chooses a random number A and computes their public variable A = A . . Then, the actor (APs and controller) with identity ID A delivers (PV A , ID A ) to the C s A by using open channel. Furthermore, the C s A selects a random number A {1,2, … , t − 1}, calculates A = A . , computes the certificate Cert A = A + PV A , computes auxiliary variable A = ℋ 1 ( e t A , ID A ) . A + Υ and, then, hand over a certificate Cert A with auxiliary variable (Cert A , aux A ) to the actors (APs and controller) via insecure link. Moreover, each actor (APs and controller) creates his private key A A = H 1 (Cert A , ID A ) . w A + aux A and make his public key as Q A = A A . d.
Querying Phase
The APs call the SG algorithm, that is, the APs compute the public key of controller Q c ≟ H 2 (Cert c , ID c ) . Cert c + T. Next, they choose a random number Ω {1, 2, … , t − 1} and compute = Ω .
, select a fresh nonce N, compute the session key SK = Ω . Q c and produced the cipher text C = ℇ ( ‖ N), compute the hash value Λ = H 2 ( ‖ N) and signature = Ω -Λ . A ap , then, hand over = {C,S} to the controller using insecure channel.
Verification and Response
For this purpose, the controller first calls a US algorithm, that is, the controller, first, computes the public key of APs ap ≟ ℋ 2 ( e t ap , ID ap ) . e t s + Τ, computes = .
+ Λ . ap , recovers the secret key = c . and produces the plaintext ( ‖ N) = ( ), computes the hash value Λ / = ℋ 2 ( ‖ N), accepts the signcryption text = { ,Λ, }, if Λ / = ℋ 2 ( ‖ N) ≟ Λ = ℋ 2 ( ‖ N) and encrypts the data QR = E (PHRI) for Aps, and delivers it using the open networks.
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Computational Cost
The comparison among the proposed CB-SN access control scheme and existing ones, i.e., Li et al. [22] , Omala et al. [15] , Gao et al. [24] , Braeken et al. [17] , Braeken et al. [19] Schemes 1, 2, and 3, on the basis of major operations is provided in this section. Normally, the computational cost includes an expensive mathematical operation, for example, bilinear pairing ( ), modular exponential ( ), elliptic curve scalar multiplication (e ), and hyper-elliptic curve divisor scalar multiplication (ℎ ), while designing a cryptographic algorithm. Next, in Table 3 , we provide a required major operation of the proposed CB-SN access control scheme and existing ones, i.e., Li et al. [22] , Omala et al. [15] , Gao et al. [24] , Braeken et al. [17] , Braeken et al. [19] Schemes 1, 2, and 3. The calculated values of Table 3 , regarding ,
, and e are based on [27] , and is based on the assumption of [29] . Therefore, according to [29] , the single required 14.90 ms, single consumes 1.25 ms, and single e needs 0.97 ms, while the assumption of [29] , about single ℎ is that, it required 0.48 ms. The experiment was performed by using the hardware resources, i.e., Intel Core i74510UCPU, 8 GB RAM, and 2.0GHz processor and software resources such as C++ with Multi-precision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C Library (MIRACL) and window 7. By using the data of Table 3 , our scheme reduced the computational cost on the basis of ms from Li et al. [22] is (2 + 6e + 2 ) -(7ℎ )/ (2 + 6e + 2 ) = 36.94 -3.36/36.94*100 = 90.90%, Omala et al. [15] is (6e ) -(7 ℎ )/(6 e ) = 5.82 -3.36/5.82*100 = 42.26%, Gao et al. [23] is (7e ) -(7ℎ )/(7e ) = 6.77 -3.36/6.77*100 = 50.36%, Braeken et al. [17] is (9e ) -(7ℎ )/(9e ) = 8.73 -3.36/8.73*100 = 61.51%, Braeken et al. [19] scheme 1(S1) is (7e ) -(7ℎ )/(7e ) = 6.77 -3.36/6.77*100 = 50.36%, Braeken et al. [19] scheme 2(S2) is (7e ) -(7ℎ )/(7e ) = 6.77 -3.36/6.77*100 =50.36%, Braeken et al. [19] scheme 3(S3) is (8e ) -(7ℎ )/(8e ) = 7.76 -3.36/7.76*100 = 56.70%, respectively. Moreover, in Table 4 , we deliver the computational cost on the basis of milliseconds (ms) among the proposed CB-SN access control and those of Li et al. [23] , Omala et al. [15] , and Gao et al. [24] . Furthermore, in Figure 4 , the clear computational cost reduction is shown. Comparative analysis of communication cost of the proposed CB-SN scheme with relevant existing schemes are provided in Figure 5 , which shows a clear savings of communication cost. 
Conclusions
Connected health brings together multidisciplinary technologies, such as the Internet of things (IoT) and wireless body area networks (WBAN), to provide preventive or proactive healthcare services by connecting devices and persons to build up the modern healthcare system. However, due to the openness of the wireless environment, the privacy of people's physiological data, and resourceconstrained nature of IoT devices, especially in terms of energy supply, often body sensors are vulnerable to different kinds of known and unknown cryptographic attacks. To tackle these issues, a comprehensive review of the existing certificate-based signcryption schemes was carried out in the literature. We found that these schemes are based on hard problems, i.e., elliptic curve and bilinear pairing, suffering from high computational cost and communication overhead. Therefore, to solve this problem, a new design scheme, called certificate-based signcryption access control scheme, is introduced, because the new scheme involves a hyper-elliptic curve, which offers the same level of security as the elliptic curve and bilinear pairing with lower key size. Furthermore, in the proposed scheme addresses and resolves intelligently the issues of increased computational cost and undesired communication overhead. 
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